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LEADERSHIP AND MAJORITARIANISM:
A RESPONSE
Barry Friedman*
In Dialogue and Judicial Review1 I sought to replace the prevailing description of the role of judicial review-that of the
"countermajoritarian difficulty" -with a description that more
accurately portrays the role constitutional courts play in American society. In the context of the "countermajoritarian difficulty," courts are seen as aloof from society, occasionally
trumping the will of political majorities. I suggested that to the
extent majoritarianism is a meaningful concept, courts are no less
majoritarian than other branches of government. But I also recognized that the idea of majoritarianism is, as a description of
any part of our political process, including courts, extremely
problematic. Finally, I redescribed the process of constitutional
decisionmaking as a dialogue among numerous elements of society. In that dialogue courts speak to the issues, but they also
facilitate and tend the dialogue.
In their comment on my article, Professors Solimine and
Walker disagree with certain aspects of my approach. Primarily,
they find flawed to a certain extent my reliance on polling data to
support my argument that the Supreme Court is no less
majoritarian than other branches of government.z The area of
disagreement between us may not be great, however, for
Solimine and Walker "agree with [my] broad conclusions."3 Utimately they conclude "[m]ajoritarianism is not a dichotomous variable, but is instead continuous."4 Then Solimine and Walker
move from the descriptive to the normative, arguing: "It is dangerous for any branch, elected or not, to be too majoritarian."s
*

Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993).
2. Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, The Supreme Court, Judicial Review,
and the Public: Leadership Versus Dialogue, 11 Const. Comm. 1, 2-3 (1993).
3. ld. at 5.
4. ld. Indeed, we probably do not disagree at all. Fully one-third of my article is
devoted to demonstrating the bankrupt nature of the entire dichotomous approach to
majoritarianism.
5. ld.
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Finally, they express the fear that "the public in the future will
demand an even more majoritarian Court, perhaps to our deep
regret."6
In their shift from the descriptive to the normative Solimine
and Walker reveal a paradox that perhaps colors all our thinking
regarding judicial review. Solimine and Walker believe no
branch should be too majoritarian because government is supposed to provide leadership, and leadership is inconsistent with
the idea of majority rule.7 Similarly, a blind adherence to majoritarianism will lead to the tyranny of the majority, a state of affairs no one, from the framing to the present, has argued is
entirely desirable.s
The paradox is that majoritarianism is inconsistent with
leadership, but most of us seem to want both out of government,
including the judiciary. This paradox was quite evident in the last
presidential election, particularly with regard to the campaign of
Citizen Perot. Ostensibly, Perot's campaign was a populist, grass
roots campaign. Its appeal rested in returning government to the
people. According to Perot and his adherents, government was
off on some tangent of its own, instead of listening to the folks
that paid the bills. But reality diverged from rhetoric in the Perot
campaign, as Perot's detractors made clear. Perot's campaign,
though ostensibly grass roots, apparently was funded and run
from one focus: Perot himself. To some Perot seemed the autocratic despot, who would bully the country into following his
edicts to the peril of our balanced system of government.
The paradox of Perot's campaign is that despite Perot's followers' desire for returning government to the people, Perot's
autocratic nature was probably as much a selling point to them as
it was a negative to his detractors. Just as much of the criticism
of George Bush and the Congress was that they were doing little
to move the country in any direction, much of Perot's appeal
seemed to be that he was a "take charge" sort of person who
would pursue strong policies to cure the country's ills. In short,
for all the rhetoric about returning government to the people,
what the Perot candidacy really seemed to be about was a desire
for leadership in government. When Perot supporters talked
about returning government to the people, they really meant to
tum government over to their chosen leader.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 5.
8. ld.
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The paradox was not confined to Perot's campaign, however: it was present in reverse in the other candidates' campaigns.
In the eyes of many, the 1992 presidential election campaign was
about leadership. Thus, candidates Bush and Clinton tried to
present themselves as leaders. Meanwhile, their pollsters-as is
common in our latter-twentieth century politics-worked hard to
keep their hand on the pulse of the American people. Why? So
their candidates would know what policies, as "leaders," they
ought to suggest. Perot aside, the election was an exercise in
"leaders" asking what the public wanted so they could appear to
be leading.
This same paradox infects our attempt to understand the
role of judicial review.9 Nowhere is this more evident than in
Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch, the work that
more than any other brought to the fore the problem of the
"countermajoritarian difficulty."w In The Least Dangerous
Branch, Bickel began with his fundamental point: how to explain
the role of courts in a government that calls itself a democracy?
Courts are neither elected by nor beholden to the people.u Yet
Bickel resolved the problem by assigning to courts the most
countermajoritarian view of courts imaginable: according to
Bickel, given their insulation from the body politic, courts should
be opinion leaders and prophets regarding constitutional
norms.tz
Solimine and Walker offer a view of judicial review similar
to Bickel's. After suggesting that I make too much of data that
shows public support for many Supreme Court decisions, and
public support generally for the Court, Solimine and Walker offer a "restatement" of the problem.tJ Although they recognize
that, at least "over generations, the Court is as majoritarian as
any other branch of government is, or ought to be,"t4 they argue
that no branch, including the courts, should be too
majoritarian.t 5 Why? "One of the functions of leadership is to
create new majorities and the Court has a leadership role as important as that of any other branch of government, as measured
by public support and acceptance (or acquiescence) in its deci9. I take no credit for this idea, but merely for its present formulation. For a particularly eloquent statement of the tension in our views regarding judicial review see Louis
Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1571 (1988).
10. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
11. ld. at 16-17.
12. Id. at 239.
13. Solimine and Walker, 11 Const. Comm. at 5 (cited in note 2).
14. ld.
15. ld.
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sions. "16 They have thus at least partially returned to Bickel's
identificaion of and solution to the countermajoritarian paradox.
In Dialogue and Judicial Review my approach was to tackle
the paradox by returning the discussion of judicial review from
the normative to the descriptive. Normative visions of judicial
review had, in my mind, all failed to the extent that they began
from the premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty. The
countermajoritarian difficulty is deeply flawed as a descriptive
matter, in part for many reasons that form the backdrop for this
dialogue between me and Professors Solimine and Walker. As
an alternative, I offered a description of courts as facilitating and
speaking in a society-wide dialogue about the meaning of the
Constitution.
As I describe at length in Dialogue and Judicial Review, the
answer to the paradox rests in the inherent workings of our constitutional system, which constantly moves all branches in and
out of line with public opinion. For the elected branches this cycle is regular and apparent, enforced by regular elections.
Whether we elect people that do reflect our views, or elect representatives who work hard around election time to make it appear
that they reflect our views, the fact is that periodic alignments
can and do occur with regard to the elected branches. Thus, at
times politicians, whether they are leading are not, may drift
away from public opinion, but elections determine whether the
leadership meets with our approval.
Despite the fact that judges are not elected, and do not serve
for fixed terms, there also is an opportunity for periodic alignment of the judiciary with the views of the public. That alignment occurs in part, though not exclusively, through the process
of presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. As
Solimine and Walker recognize, "there are indirect mechanisms
[for linking the public to the Court] ... such as the appointment
of Justices by like-minded Presidents."11
What is evident, however, is that unlike the regular cycle of
popular elections, whatever the basis for aligning the courts with
the public, it is far less certain and regular than for the elected
branches. Thus, the cycling that occurs between public and judiciary is subject to much broader sweeps and longer terms. There
are going to be times, such as prior to President Roosevelt's

16. ld.
17. ld. at 4.
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Court-packing plan, when the Court gets very far out of line with
public opinion,ts
Yet, it is this very broad cycling that helps in part to resolve
the paradox, for it turns out that the judiciary can and will be
both majoritarian and countermajoritarian. There will be times
when the Supreme Court is very much in line with public opinion; indeed, we may be living through one of them. But just as
the courts will sometimes fall into step with public opinion, and
sometimes fall behind it, they also will fall in front of it. There
will be times when the courts do lead public opinion. The Warren Court is an example, though perhaps it taught us the limits of
judicial leadership.
The intriguing area for further inquiry that this understanding opens up involves determining the best balance between
leadership and majoritarianism, and how the swings in cycles can
be moderated if that is appropriate. Solimine and Walker surely
are correct that we wish some leadership from the Supreme
Court, just as they are correct that too much majoritarianism can
be a bad thing. But by the same token, too much leadership may
be no different than no leadership at all, for if Dred Scott taught
us anything, it is that a public deeply disenchanted with judicial
decisionmaking will look for other solutions.

18. See generally Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey,
Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law: Themes for the Constitution's Third Century
809-10 (West Pub. Co., 1993).

